The terrorist attacks on 9/11 and the subsequent so called 'War on Terror' led to a flurry of discussion about whether, under some very special circumstances, a liberal democracy could legally and morally use torture to protect its citizens.
problematic and that the criticisms commonly raised against it, are often inappropriate or irrelevant. We argue that a great many critics misunderstand the way in which thought experiments in general, and this one in particular, are supposed to work in philosophical (and for that matter scientific) inquiry.
Consequently, the paper is not seeking to decide on the acceptability or otherwise of FLIT per se but rather in the problematic use of a particular mode of argumentation about the justifiability or rejection of torture. We believe that FLIT is never justified 5 but do so for reasons that do not require the erroneous endorsement or rejection of the TBS. While it is now commonplace that the TBS is the focus of both non-philosophers and philosophers arguing about FLIT, it is important to make clear just why this particular thought experiment is not used correctly in such contexts. In order to do this, the paper examines the standard arguments against using the TBS in discussions of FLIT and concludes that for the most part they are simply irrelevant due to a misunderstanding of how thought experiments work in philosophical argument. By rescuing the TBS from its erroneous use we can then see its proper worth as part of an argumentative device in uncovering intuitions in our search for moral truths.
The TBS and Thought-Experiments in Philosophy
The various forms in which the TBS is presented share a common structure, which
Brecher sets out as follows:
Suppose there is good reason to think that someone has planted a bomb in a public place. And suppose there is good reason to think that it is going to go off in the next two hours or so, and that it is going to kill and maim dozens of people, maybe hundreds. … But no one knows where the bomb is -except one person, who is already in custody. Naturally, they have no intention of revealing where the bomb is. Maybe they have planted it themselves, maybe not. Either way, they remain silent. Should they be tortured to force them to reveal where the bomb is?
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From this we can derive the core characteristics of any TBS:
1. The security forces know (or have a very good reason to think) that a terrorist attack is imminent in a heavily populated city.
2. The security forces have captured a terrorist who they know is involved in this attack and who knows the whereabouts of the bomb or bombs which will detonate in the very near futuretypically within 24 hours.
3. The terrorist can be forced to reveal the whereabouts of the bomb so that detonation can be prevented in time to save many innocent lives.
4. The only way to achieve (3) in the time available is to use torture.
5. There is no other viable way to prevent the attack occurring.
6. The only motive for using torture is to save lives, (not to punish the terrorist or obtain vengeance).
7. The circumstances are exceptional and very rare.
The TBS can be tweaked in various ways to make the example even more dramatic and desperate. For example, the politician (a President or Prime Minister) is told that the bomb is a nuclear device and the person to be tortured is not the terrorist himself (he is inured to such treatment) but a family memberhis child or wife or mother. These modifications also attempt, firstly, to forestall a response that says accepting some civilian casualties from a bombing is the unfortunate cost civilized and moral societies must face rather than engage in any form of torture. But many people would regard such a position as amounting to moral fanaticism when it involves accepting the preventable deaths and injury of tens of thousands of people.
Secondly, if it is the family member who is tortured rather than the terrorist himself, then the moral dilemma is made even starker, since it can't be resolved by claiming that the torture victim deserves his fate because he aims to commit mass murder. Whatever we think about the acceptability or otherwise of FLIT, there can be no doubt whatever that torturing the terrorist's young child is an appallingly immoral act.
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The different possible filling-in of details in the various versions of the TBS serves as a reminder that we are dealing with an imaginary scenario -a thoughtexperiment. So what exactly is the role played by such experiments in philosophical argumentation?
Two paradigm cases of Thought Experiments
Before evaluating the TBS as a thought-experiment, let us take a look at two Although the presentation of the story ends with a straightforward question that appears to require a straightforward answer, the aim of the experiment is significantly more complex than refutation of a moral principle. It occurs as part of a case against utilitarianism, but that case is not of the form 'utilitarianism yields the result that Jim should shoot the Indian; our intuitive response is that would be wrong, so utilitarianism is false'. Williams accepts, with the utilitarian, that shooting the Indian is probably the right thing to do. 12 But Williams takes issue with the utilitarian implication that shooting the Indian is obviously the right thing to do, suggesting that even if it is the right thing, there is room to wonder if it is obviously the right thing, and suggests that other considerations (especially about integrity) 'come in to finding the answer ' (1973: 99) . One way of capturing his argument is that he is using the case to show that we do not use the word 'right' in the way that Utilitarians say we do. how we use our words, there would be a relevant problem only if the imagined scenario disallowed the application of the terms in question -if they had no purchase under the specified conditions (and not just that they are incorrectly being applied in the view of the theory being questioned).
Thomson's thought-experiment in no way relies on the claim that it presents a realistic scenario. It is highly unlikely that we could actually plug a violinist into someone else's kidneys and it is certain that no respectable hospital would allow such an event. However all this is beside the point, since the thought-experiment simply stipulates that this is done along with a number of other conditions in order to explore the permissibility or otherwise of abortion. It focuses on the failure of one particular argument against the permissibility of abortion to distinguish two concepts that are inadvertently being run together. 13 And when we turn to Williams' thought experiment, we find a scenario which may well also be impossible in reality, but which is readily intelligible and in a position to contribute to the semantic issues with which its surrounding argument is concerned.
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Criticisms of the TBS
Opponents of the TBS regard it as the best available argument for torture: a deeply seductive argument that mesmerises theorists and others looking for justification for torture. 15 So if the TBS can be shown to be unreliable or based on false assumptions then, its opponents feel, there can be no credible case for justifying torture under any circumstances. Conversely if the TBS cannot be refuted then its acceptance, so it is argued, could undermine the very fabric of liberal democratic societies, and undo all the work which has been done to remove torture, along with slavery and genocide, as acceptable activities of civilised persons and states. This is the source of the deep emotions displayed in the arguments, with the concomitant talk of 'torture lawyers', and the denunciation of those who invoke the TBS as being guilty of bad faith, pernicious motives and intellectual fraud.
What then are the criticisms raised against the TBS? There are at least five different ones 16 : the first two raise concerns about the wisdom of discussing the TBS itself, while the other three focus on the way the thought experiment is set up and used in discussions of moral, political and legal theory. We briefly outline each concern below.
i) Moral concerns with discussing the TBS
This criticism does not address the structure or content of the TBS itself since it argues that the mere consideration of such scenarios is morally corrupting and must therefore be avoided. This concern takes two forms, the first focusing on individuals who engage in discussions of this sort. The fact that one can even imagine a scenario where torture could have moral legitimacy and is not unequivocally condemned reveals, so it is claimed, a corrupt mind that has lost its moral compass 17 , because even considering the justifiability of FLIT is to fail to respect persons as one ought to do -as moral beings. Scenarios such as the TBS, either deliberately or through ignorance, obscure the horror of torture and thereby illegitimately manipulate moral and ethical judgments.
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The second version of the moral concern looks to the external and general effect of discussing whether any form of torture could be legitimate. Žižek, for example, once argued that any discussion about torture, especially one conducted by decent and well-meaning persons, that does not argue for a total abolition confers a spurious legitimacy that is very dangerous indeed. It has an even more dangerous effect than the explicit endorsement of torture as it allows and encourages unscrupulous and immoral persons to claim that their views on torture are supported by strong arguments and mainstream opinion.
19
ii) Reality and Frequency of the TBS
The next objection to the use of the TBS in literature, films and academic discussions about torture is the claim that it erroneously implies that the TBS is a state of affairs that does actually obtain in the real world. 20 Critics dispute that this is indeed the case and claim that even if it were, its frequency is very rare indeed. There is no clear empirical evidence that such scenarios arise even in countries such as Israel which has faced frequent terrorist attacks for decades.
The frequent presentation of the TBS in fictional or hypothetical situations is a self-indulgent and ultimately dangerous philosophical parlour-game, whose lack of realism necessarily leads to a serious distortion of our moral reasoning, particularly when used to help form social and political policy. We should instead follow the rule that legal and moral principles ought not to be based on (or strongly influenced by) extreme scenarios, with their dangerously distorting power.
iii) Erroneous assumptions underlying the TBS
This third criticism of the TBS, perhaps the most common one, claims that very nearly all the core assumptions underlying this thought experiment are either false or unrealisable in practice. Essentially, the TBS erroneously assumes a degree of knowledge and certainty that is impossible (or so unlikely that genuine cases are vanishingly rare), yet that assumption is crucial to the plausibility of the thought experiment. When the core assumptions that underlie the TBS are examined, critics argue that the first five are deeply problematic.
Recall the seven core assumptions:
2.
The security forces have captured a terrorist who they know is involved in this attack and who knows the whereabouts of the bomb which will detonate in the very near future -typically within 24 hours.
3.
The terrorist can be forced to reveal the whereabouts of the bomb so that detonation can be prevented in time to save many innocent lives.
4.
The only way to achieve (3) in the time available is to use torture.
5.
There is no other viable way to prevent the attack occurring.
6. The only motive for using torture is to save lives, not to punish the terrorist.
7.
The circumstances are exceptional and very rare.
Critics argue, with respect to assumptions 1 -3, that here the TBS scenario rests on the claims that the relevant authorities know that the detonation of the bomb is imminent, and that they have definitely captured the right person (the terrorist) who can be forced to reveal the location of the bomb in time and this will save many innocent lives. But in real-life situations none of these claims could be made with anything like the necessary certainty. Empirical evidence demonstrates that such supposed certainties prove to be mistaken time and time again, especially since security services rely on intelligence gathering that is frequently incomplete and based on probabilistic reasoning. is not certainty (there are no aspects of human conduct of which we are absolutely certain) but rather a genuine reasonable expectation given available information at the time. The authorities need not be certain a bomb has been planted, and that they have captured the person who planted it, and that torture will reveal its whereabouts. Rather all that is needed is that they have a reasonable expectation that this is the case. argument but rather about how they can be misused and abused by those who hold a particular ideological view in favour of torture. We return to this point below when discussing the TBS and social policy.
TBS as a conceptual aid
Like Thomson's and Williams's thought experiments discussed in section 2, the TBS occurs embedded in complex arguments. As used by its proponents, it hardly ever occurs in the bald way in which we originally presented it. To find it in that form, you have to look, as we did, to its detractors. The point is significant in that What is the aim of this thought-experiment? One thing it is clearly not doing is setting up an intuition-pump to elicit the response 'the rebel leader should be tortured', thereby revealing a moral fact and showing torture to be justifiable.
Rather, Walzer is illustrating a possible tension between strong commitments, a tension that might well not appear under ordinary conditions. We suggested in section 2 that a central use of thought-experiment could be to draw out which of two commitments we feel more deeply; in this case, Walzer is suggesting a tension that cannot be resolved. Here he is making an argument for the phenomenon of 'dirty hands' where, paradoxically, one does wrong in order to do right. In the TBS, the duty to fulfil one's political commitments requires you to break another cherished value -namely, never to engage in the evil of torture 28 .
At no point in the article is Walzer setting up an argument for why torture can be justified; instead, he claims that even if you are justified in a dirty hands scenario in committing torture, this action nevertheless remains an evil for which you ought to suffer the appropriate moral opprobrium and punishment. Whatever we think about the plausibility of the 'dirty hands' claim, it's clear that the TBS is not being used here simply to show that torture is justified.
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The criticisms outlined in section 3 above take it to be the aim of the thought experiment to demonstrate that instances of torture can be justified, or even to provide a justification for a policy of state torture. But this is simply wrong.
Their claims about the TBS, at the very least, should raise strong suspicions that a straw person argument is at work here, or that the role played by it in philosophical discourse has been misunderstood. We now turn to the detail of the objections to show that this is the case.
The problem with the standard criticisms i) Responding to the moral concerns
The first criticism raised a general objection to the contemplation of any situation involving torture, on prior moral grounds. 
ii) Responding to the Reality concern
The first concern about lack of realism is that to base policy or moral principles on extreme cases is misleading and dangerous. We agree with this concern, which is reflected in the legal adage that hard cases make bad law. Policy must fit the cases that people actually face all of the time. And a few extreme cases cannot provide the basis for any respectable moral principle. If these were indeed the aims of a TBS-based argument, it would be in trouble. But these are not aims of most uses of the TBS, and perhaps not of any mainstream philosophical ones.
As we have explained, a thought-experiment like the TBS stands only to show a moral principle to be false or at least not absolute. Absolute principles must apply in all possible cases; the rarity or improbability of a counter-example is just irrelevant to the aim of showing a purportedly absolute principle to be false or at least not invariably applicable. What is more, thought-experiments like the TBS and those set out in section 2 don't even have such basic aims. Note also that universally philosophical discussions of the TBS are made within the context of supporting a policy against torture, suggesting only that this conflicts with other commitments. This is entirely compatible with the view that although one might have very strong reasons to transgress the policy under certain conditions, nonetheless a rule against torture always remains the best policy.
The most that an objection about the unreality of the TBS could establish is that a policy which is based upon it is superfluous since the circumstances for its use will never arise. This does not demonstrate that the TBS is an illegitimate or harmful thought-experiment -and those are the points that proponents of the unreality objections are seeking to make. Perhaps the most strenuously argued epistemological concern about the TBS is that it erroneously assumes that torture is efficacious in getting the information required. Critics claim that although it is undoubtedly successful as a tool of humiliation and oppression, it is not a reliable means of extracting what people know from them -especially not in a limited time period. 33 But once again, this seems to be beside the point. It can be stipulated in the description of the case that this captive will succumb to torture, or at least that the interrogators have strong evidence that he will. The claim that torture does not work will only affect the thought-experiment if either (i) it is a necessary truth that torture does not work or
iii) Responding to the epistemological concerns -erroneous assumptions
(ii) the aim of the TBS was the creation of a policy on when to torture, and the evidence shows that torture never actually works. But both (i) and (ii) are clearly false.
iv) Responding to the institutionalization of torture concern
Here the claim is that the TBS fails to include, in its assessment of the harm done by allowing torture, the inevitable social consequences: the institutionalisation of torture, and the pernicious effect this would have on a range of caring, legal and educational professions.
There is some force to this objection, but its effect is at best limited. As we have stressed, a positive response to the TBS in no way implies agreement with the legalization of torture. Sensible philosophical use of the TBS examines a collision of incompossible values; it does not seek to justify a social policy of torture. Consequently, the fact that the TBS omits to mention the issue of institutionalisation is not a problem; the TBS is emphatically not involved in a discussion about the wisdom of legalized torture. This issue may be relevant to work such as Dershowitz's 34 when he advocates torture warrants, but then it is an objection to a different thought-experiment from the TBS altogether -one which might be called the Legalized TBS -'LTBS'.
v) Responding to torture as lesser evil
Critics such as Bufacchi and Arrigo argue that the TBS's conclusion that torture is justified is based on a mistaken understanding of the consequences of allowing torture. One-off situations open the door to a torture policy and this can never be the lesser of evils. But this criticism is irrelevant in the same way as the ones previously discussed: those introducing the TBS can in effect stipulate whether torture in this scenario is indeed the lesser evil by stipulating the alternative outcomes. Again, it is important to underline the point that provided such stipulation is not absurd or logically impossible, it does not render the TBS useless or misleading as a philosophical thought experiment.
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TBS and social policy
The response we have offered to the various objections above raises another thought, one that is relevant and should be addressed. If the TBS need not be realistic, if the assumptions it is based on are not realisable in the real world, then what does the TBS teach us about whether we should ever justify FLIT? At best the TBS is irrelevant to the debate on torture and it is pointless (and probably irresponsible) to raise it.
This argument is, however, rather too quick. Firstly, the TBS gives us some useful and important insight into the problem of incompossible moral oughts, providing intuitions which we can then use to equilibrate with our moral principles. It highlights the problem with moral claims or principles based on a monistic moral theory. It might illustrate, for example, how a particular understanding of moral obligation fails to fully comprehend the complexity of conflicting obligations that can occur in a person's life. For instance, deontological solutions to the TBS with the insistence on inviolable absolute moral principles 36 sit very uncomfortably with the terrible consequences they are obliged to accept; 'Justice be done though the heavens fall' 37 is a credo for fanatics. Similarly, it might be used to argue that a consequentialist attempt to resolve the problem by reducing the issue to calculating possible harms or choosing the lesser evil does violence to our intuitions about our moral reality.
The TBS both raises and illuminates the possibility that in some situations we are faced with inescapable moral wrongdoing no matter what we choose -we are condemned to get dirty hands. The TBS illustrates this conceptual problem rather well but it is only part of a bigger and more complex argument. Our moral reality, it seems, includes a range of conflicting demands on our practical moral reasoning, each demand backed by credible independent claims which can sometimes pull in incompatible directions.
So the TBS has a valuable place in investigating conceptual issues in moral theory. But does it tell us anything useful about the issue that most concerns its opponents, namely which policy implications we ought to adopt? Here we need to be very clear about what insights arise from using the TBS in our discussions about FLIT. Firstly, the TBS by itself tells us nothing about a sound or wise social policy about FLIT or anything else. It is not designed to do this, even though both those who oppose and those who seek to justify FLIT seem to think that it does.
Secondly, as Walzer points out, even if the TBS does justify FLIT in rare one off dirty hands situations, this does not change our strong beliefs that torture always is a horrendous moral crime and ought never to be practised. Some may claim, using a battery of arguments among which is the TBS, that under these rare and special circumstances FLIT may be the right thing to do, but that it nevertheless remains a moral crime to be unequivocally condemned and punished. This is the paradox of dirty hands where you are both praised and condemned for doing wrong to do right. However we need to stress that this is just one conclusion we could draw from the TBS. There could be (and indeed are) different conclusions which might be drawn. Some might argue, for example, that abhorrent though torture is, and wrong-making though it always is, torture may be right in some rare cases, though it doesn't follow that it ought to be legalised. Or if it is reasonable to believe that even engaging in very rare cases of FLIT does indeed produce a slippery slope descent into a settled policy of torture, then it may never be justified, as Brecher and others conclude. In short, the TBS may form part of the discussion about social policy but it certainly does not determine in which direction we should go. That issue is decided by a far more extensive discussion with a battery of arguments that may or may not draw on the TBS itself.
Thirdly the TBS, even if it successfully responded to all the criticisms raised against it, does not justify a social policy of torture or undo a firm legal prohibition against such acts. If an interrogator acts outside the legal framework and uses FLIT he must then face legal charges and justify his actions ex post. He will need to convince a judge and jury that the situation was one that allowed for no other reasonable solution and that the torture used was the right course of action given the risks of not so doing. Gross refers to these actions as 'official disobedience' which can only be justified ex post by demonstrating that it was the only appropriate way to effectively confront an extremely grave national danger or threat. 38 This is not an easy argument to make and its aim is to ensure that FLIT is used only when it is really necessary. This stringency is needed to reassure the public in a liberal democracy that the state's actions are subject to the law even when agents in pursuit of their duty of care to citizens must sometimes break the law. The legal taboo on FLIT must always remain intact even if breaking the law can be retrospectively justified and excused as necessary for public safety. We think that the work of Dershowitz is profoundly mistaken in its call for torture warrants, and his use of the TBS certainly gives no support to his view.
Finally, what of the concern that the TBS is peculiarly open to misuse because of the way it is set up? The solution to this problem is to give an accurate account of what the TBS does as a thought experiment -something we have tried to do here -rather than remain silent about it. A proper understanding of the role of thought experiments in philosophical discourse will, to some degree, serve to prevent their misuse. The TBS is a useful and important thought experiment and, here as elsewhere, we must not let our fear that an argument will be misused force us to throw the baby out with the bathwater.
Concluding comments
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One group has certain sentences omitted from the passage they read. Both groups report the same emotional impact of the passage, but the subjects with the added sentences insist that those sentences were the ones mainly responsible for the effect the passage had on them. So there is reason to doubt that we know to what features we are responding in a story and we may well claim features to be morally relevant (on the grounds of what we take to be affecting us) which were not the ones that really led to our response. Opponents of the TBS might suggest that this undermines any significance that the thought-experiment could claim to have. While experiments like this are intriguing, we do not believe that they affect thought-experiments in any way that would assist the case against the TBS. It is true that our intuitive responses lack epistemic authority -but thoughtexperiments cannot sensibly be understood as being in that business. We may not know what causes our responses to a fictional scenario, but it is why we think we respond that reveals our relative commitments. The current empirical evidence does not affect thought-experiments as contributors to this enterprise. For more detailed discussion see XXXX. 36 We are not suggesting that all deontologists are absolutist. 37 This is the latin legal phrase: Fiat justitia ruat caelum 38 Gross 2004: 41. 39 Wantchekon and Healy, 1999: 596. 40 These quotes are taken from the endorsements on the back cover of Brecher's book 'Torture and the Ticking Bomb' by Geoffrey Robertson QC and Gabriel Palmer-Fernandez respectively.
